Reynolds Answers Judge Daniels’ Dismissal
Of the Reynolds’ 9/11 Law Suit

By Morgan Reynolds

September 19th, 2008

On June 26, 2008, Judge George B. Daniels dismissed three 9/11 law suits with prejudice, including my “no planes crashed at the WTC” lawsuit against NIST contractors. My conclusion? Disappointment but no surprise. The dismissal was highly likely if not certain. Yes, it would have been great to interrogate the government’s hired cover-up artists under sworn oath to “tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” subject to perjury penalties. My case, as well as Dr. Judy Wood’s suit, held the potential to break the 9/11 conspiracy wide open, so I had to try. The judge’s decision, badly crafted and over-the-top, nearly hysterical, combined with his subsequent denial of my motion for reconsideration, brilliantly drafted by attorney Jerry V. Leaphart, on the same day no less, established two results in my mind:

1. There is no justice system when push-comes-to-shove because the powerful will be served, as blatantly demonstrated on Wall Street this September, and

2. The government and its agents cannot withstand discovery under oath by a savvy prosecutor or plaintiff, so it will not be allowed to happen. Any dishonest reply or faking of evidence by NIST contractors would have drawn another question, exposing the lie. Judge Daniels betrayed his oath of office by protecting NIST contractors from the questions they could not answer.

So how do we win? How do we break 9/11 wide open, convict perpetrators and re-boot the system? Beats me, but we must continue to try, exploring every avenue and exploiting all peaceful opportunities as they arise. I have chosen not to appeal my “no planes” case to the federal appellate level in New York but Dr. Judy Wood has appealed her case. One appeal is enough because the judge rolled all three cases together, so one smackdown by the appeals court will be quite sufficient to confirm that the “judge-holds-a-grudge” theory applies at the appellate level when it comes to 9/11 too.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x

DR. MORGAN REYNOLDS on behalf of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff/Relator,

-against-

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP.; APPLIED RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC.; BOEING; NuSTATS; COMPUTER AIDED ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES, INC.; DATASOURCE, INC.; GEOSTAATS, INC.; GILSANZ MURRAY STEFICEK LLP; HUGHES ASSOCIATES, INC.; AJMAL ABBASI; EDUARDO KAUSEL; DAVID PARKS; DAVID SHARP; DANIELE VENEZANO; JOSEF VAN DYCK; KASPAR WILLIAM; ROLF JENSEN & ASSOCIATES, INC.; ROSENWASSER/GROSSMAN CONSULTING ENGINEERS, P.C.; SIMPSON GUMPERTZ & HEGER, INC.; S.K. GHOSH ASSOCIATES, INC.; SKIDMORE, OWING & MERRILL, LLP; TENG & ASSOCIATES, INC.; UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, INC.; WISS, JANNEY, ELSTNER ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN AIRLINES; SILVERSTEIN PROPERTIES; and UNITED AIRLINES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 07 CV 4612 (GBD)

GEORGE B. DANIELS, District Judge:

Figure: Judge George B. Daniels

In separate actions,1 three different plaintiffs, who are all represented by the same attorney, commenced individual lawsuits attempting to challenge the investigative findings, of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), as to how and why the World Trade Center buildings collapsed on 9/11.

These three cases are broadly “related” in dealing with the events of 9/11, as well as having the same attorney, but they differ in many ways, especially in terms of exact 9/11 subject matter. They also differ in terms of legal argument and cause of action (see especially Haas’ complaint under the Data Quality Act vs. the Wood and Reynolds complaints under the False Claims Act). Each case deserved a separate decision with separate reasoning and exact quotations and facts. The failure to do so diminishes the seriousness, the sanctity, the gravity of each case, if you will, in favor of belittling their importance. Judge Daniels could hardly be unaware of this.

The focus of the NIST investigation was on the sequence of events “from the instance of aircraft impact to the initiation of collapse for each tower.” Plaintiffs claim that a terrorist attack was not responsible for the destruction of the World Trade Center complex (“WTC”).

OK, the preceding sentence is in the spirit of the Reynolds and Wood position but I never made such a statement in my court filings; perhaps that is why no quotation is cited. In general, Reynolds and Wood focus on proof of fraud committed by the defendants rather than sermonize about what really [might have] happened. Further, we, as the plaintiffs, were under no obligation to specify a complete alternative theory, but only show willful blindness and deception on the part of the defendants, who obediently served the regime for profit by conjuring up models and the like designed to reach the “right” conclusions. NIST, of course, conducted no scientific investigation to discover what happened at the WTC but instead cooked up 10,000 pages of hokum to support the official 9/11 tale.

According to plaintiffs, the evidence demonstrates that the destruction of the World Trade Center Towers was caused by a United States secret military “directed energy weapon.”2

Where does this statement about “a United States secret military” DEW come from? Neither Wood nor Reynolds ever submitted such a statement to the court. This is especially incongruous for the my case because my pleading disputes the claim by NIST contractors that two Boeing 767s disappeared into the steel and concrete twin towers on 9/11/01 and never deals directly with the cause of the destruction/dustification of the towers. Further, the judge totally ignores my substantive claims that the factual evidence supports the conclusion that no planes violently collided into the twin towers at the WTC.

Plaintiffs’ attorney argues that “the defendants knowingly participated in the fraud of furthering the false claim that two wide-body jetliners hit the World Trade Center on 9/11/01.”3 (Reynolds Opp’n Mem. at 1).

This is an OK statement here. Isn’t it nice to have an undisputed quotation?

Congress authorized NIST, a non-regulatory agency within the United States Department of Commerce, to conduct the technical investigation into the structural failings leading to the collapse of the Twin Towers and the building located at 7 World Trade Center

1 The three related cases that are pending before this Court are: Wood v. Applied Research Associates, Inc., et al, 07 CV 3314 (GBD); Reynolds v. Science Applications Int’l, et ql, 07 CV 4612 (GBD) and Haas v. Gutierrez, et al, 07 CV 2623 (GBD).

2 Plaintiffs also claim that there is significant evidence that the cause of the destruction of World Trade Center building number 7 was a controlled demolition.

Neither Reynolds nor Wood make any claim about WTC 7 in their submissions to the court, so where is this from? Yes, Haas makes statements about WTC 7 in his case but “plaintiffs” [plural] did not.

3 3 Reynolds argues that “[t]his case involves the fraud perpetrated by the jetliner crash hoax.” (Reynolds Opp’n Mem. at 6). Wood refers to “… the expressed myth of 9/11 that 19 Arabs did it with box cutters.” (Wood Opp’n Mem. at 13). Haas contends that “World Trade Center building number 7 (WTC7) … was not damaged in any way by any jetliner impact…” “There is evidence of a controlled demolition … that NIST is overtly seeking to squelch …” (Haas Opp’n Mem. at 14).

4 This footnote seems OK in its quotations.

(“WTC7”).4 On October 16, 2005, NIST issued its “Final Report on the Collapses of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center;” which report is referred to as “NCSTAR 1.” NIST’s investigation into the collapse of WTC7 is still proceeding.

Plaintiffs Judy Wood and Morgan Reynolds each independently sued the same nongovernmental defendants who allegedly provided consulting and other services to NIST in connection with the NCSTAR 1 report.5 Plaintiff Edward Haas sued both governmental and non-governmental actors who are allegedly responsible for conducting the investigation itself, or have provided services as part of that investigation.6 All defendants, in each of the three actions,

4 As a result of the collapse of the WTC, the National Construction Safety Team Act (the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. ¤ 1703 et seq., was enacted. The purpose of the Act “is to improve the structural integrity of buildings and evacuation and emergency response procedures by investigating building failures and recommending specific improvements to building standards, codes, and practices, as well as to evacuation and emergency response procedures.” H.R. Rep. No. 107-530, at 5 (2002) reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 941, 941. Although the primary focus of the Act is on future building collapses, it nevertheless “gives NIST comprehensive authority to complete the investigation of the WTC disaster.” Id. at 14, 950; see also, 15 U.S.C. ¤ 7311 (“The authorities and restrictions applicable under this chapter … shall apply to the activities of the National Institute of Standards and Technology in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.”).

5 Plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds sued the following twenty-seven defendants: Science Applications International Corp.; Applied Research Associates, Inc.; Boeing; NuStats; Computer Aided Engineering Associates, Inc.; DataSource, Inc.; GEOSTAATS, Inc.; Gilsanz Murray Steficek LLP; Hughes Associates, Inc.; Ajmal Abbasi; Eduardo Kausel; David Parks; David Sharp; Daniele Venezano; Josef Van Dyck; Kaspar William; Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc.; Rosenwasser/Grossman Consulting Engineers, P.C.; Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc.; S.K. Ghosh Associates, Inc.; Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, LLP; Teng & Associates, Inc.; Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.; Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc.; Silverstein Properties; American Airlines and United Airlines.

Plaintiff Reynolds subsequently dismissed his action against Silverstein Properties, American Airlines and United Airlines.

Did Wood ever name/sue Silverstein Properties, AA and UAL? I do not believe so.

6 Plaintiff Haas sued the following defendants in both their individual and official capacities: Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, United States Department of Commerce; NIST’s Acting Director James Turner (pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), Acting Director Turner is

moved to dismiss the lawsuits as being frivolous, and for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), respectively. The motions to dismiss are granted and all three complaints are dismissed with prejudice.

Wow! Just like that, the defendants are granted their motions to dismiss, not only dismissed but dismissed with prejudice with virtually no “warm up” or rationale offered by Judge Daniels. Is this the normal sequence in a judicial ruling? Or is it an unusual display of contempt and prejudice by the bench toward the plaintiffs?

Plaintiffs assert that NIST’s investigation is tainted by fraud and other serious misconduct. They contend that the NCSTAR 1 report constitutes a “fraudulent document,” in that it conceals the true cause for the collapse of the Twin Towers.

Oh, yes, we do so assert because NCSTAR 1 is in fact fraudulent, as demonstrated in our affidavits.

Plaintiffs maintain that the alleged fraudulent nature of the investigation has furthered the deception, perpetrated upon the masses, that the WTC was demolished as a result of terrorists plowing two commercial airplanes, filled with thousand of gallons of jet fuel, directly into the Twin Towers at a high rate of speed.7 They claim that, through the employment of psychological operations, millions were deceived into believing that the destruction was caused by a terrorist hijacking that murdered thousands of innocent people inside. Plaintiffs theorize

“Theorize” is a loaded term. It suggests that the plaintiffs are merely armchair theorists rather than empirical researchers who have assembled powerful evidence to support their complaints of fraud by NIST contractors.

that what actually occurred was that the Twin Towers disintegrated after being struck by the United States military’s secret laser-like weaponry.

None of the plaintiffs used the expression “the United States military’s secret laser-like weaponry.” Putting words in the mouths of the plaintiffs is prejudicial, unfair and unjust. Why does Judge Daniels “reach” so badly to smear the plaintiffs?

All three plaintiffs explain that these “directed energy weapons” “are operational in Earth[‘s] orbit, at high altitude, low altitude, at sea and on land, ranging in lethality from the capacity to do great

automatically substituted for his predecessor, William A. Jeffrey); Dr. Shyam Sunder, NIST’s Lead Investigator; Dr. Theresa McAllister, NIST’s Research Structural Engineer; and Catherine Fletcher, Chief of NIST’s Management and Organization Division. Haas also named as defendants “John Doe I-V, Contractors Employed by NIST,” as well as three defendants, who were also sued by plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds, to wit, Silverstein Properties, Applied Research Associates, Inc., and Science Applications International Corp.. In plaintiff Haas’ proposed second amended complaint, he only names the Secretary of Commerce and NIST officials as defendants.

7 Plaintiffs’ lawsuits make no allegation with regard to the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in a field just outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania, or the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.

Why mention Flights 93 and 77 in this decision at all? Plaintiffs made no allegation about these alleged flights because NIST and its contractors were never mandated to investigate or “model” these alleged crashes. The Reynolds and Wood cases were well drafted in their narrowness to avoid extraneous material. Further, the court has no business asserting that Flight 93 “crashed in a field” or that Flight 77 “crashed into the Pentagon” because proof for these allegations is not in evidence. It simply is reassertion of the unproven official/media story. The intent of introducing Flights 93 and 77 appears to be to convey the impression that these alleged crashes really happened even if not shown on television (!) so, by implication, none should doubt that the alleged WTC crashes happened as officially described either. This is just troll food and does not belong in a judicial decision. The alleged crashes of flights 93 and 77 are events/material for another day and another forum and such comments do not belong in the decision. But wait, it gets worse.

damage such as that of destroying the World Trade Center Twin Towers in less than 10 seconds each, as occurred on 9/11/01, down to and including imposition of a disabling stun on human beings for crowd control and/or other psy ops [psychological operations] purposes.” (Wood Am. Compl. K 23; Reynolds Compl. ]f 22; Haas Am. Compl. ]f 25).

This quotation could be from one of the complaints or filings, not mine, but so what? The claim is provable but beside the point for the Reynolds case. Standing alone, however, the statement is a tactic whose effect is to discredit all three plaintiffs by selective quotation without getting to the heart of the cases.

Plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds commenced their respective individual actions on behalf of the United States Government for violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. ¤ 3729 et seq., claiming that the defendants hired by the Government were not entitled to payment for the allegedly fraudulent services they provided to NIST.8 The False Claims Act prohibits a person from attempting to get a fraudulent claim for payment approved by the Government, or using false records to reduce the amount one owes to the Government. In plaintiff Haas’ separate individual lawsuit, he seeks to enjoin NIST from continuing its investigation into the collapse of WTC7 on the grounds that NIST has violated the Information Quality Act9 by

8 Both plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds have asserted the same causes of action for violations of three provisions of ¤ 3729(a) which imposes liability upon:

“Any person who – –

knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government… a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; [or]

(7) knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government[.] 31 U.S.C. ¤ 3729(a)(l-2), (7).

9 The Information Quality Act directs “the Office of Management and Budget [“OMB”] … [to] issue guidelines … that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information … disseminated by Federal agencies …” Pub. L. No. 106-554, ¤ 1(a)(3) [Title V, ¤ 515], Dec. 21,

intentionally disseminating contradictory information to the public and concealing the existence of a controlled demolition event at WTC7.10 The aim of the Information Quality Act is to assure that the information publicly released by a federal agency is of the highest quality. It requires the dissemination of true and accurate information, and a mechanism for individuals, affected by that information, to seek and obtain a correction of false or inaccurate information. None of plaintiffs’ asserted legal claims can withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Why don’t the plaintiffs’ asserted legal claims withstand motions to dismiss? There is no explanation here. Examination of the plaintiffs’ affidavits and affirmations establish evidential and legal grounds to dispute this—NIST’s data and findings are as demonstrably false as the statement that 2 + 2 = 8. Further, Reynolds and Wood publicly disclosed the fraud to NIST in their Requests for Correction filed in 2007. The legal standard to commence discovery in a civil suit are ordinarily rather low and, conversely, the standard for granting motions to dismiss, especially with prejudice, are high. For example, the court is to accept the plaintiffs’ asserted facts as true, making it more difficult to grant defandants’ motions to dismiss.

NO COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

The False Claims Act affords a private individual the right to sue in federal court, on

behalf of the Government, any person who knowingly presents or makes a false or fraudulent claim for payment. See, 31 U.S.C. ¤ 3730(4)(A), (B). An individual is, however, jurisdictionally barred from bringing a FCA action that is based upon publicly disclosed

2000, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153, published at 44 U.S.C. ¤ 3516, note. It further requires that each federal agency “establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the guidelines issued” by the OMB. Id.

10 Plaintiff Haas submitted a “Request for Correction” to NIST claiming that a statement appearing in a December 12, 2006 NIST document was contrary to a statement in the NCSTAR 1 report. Although both documents indicate that there was no “evidence” of a controlled demolition event, the NCSTAR 1 report further refers to the lack of “corroborating” evidence that the towers were brought down by controlled demolition. Haas argued to NIST that the phrase ‘”corroborating evidence,’ by definition, indicates that there was some evidence of controlled demolition …” (Haas Am. Compl. Ex. A, at 26). Unable to secure a forbearance agreement from NIST, Haas commenced the instant action seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining NIST from continuing its investigation until the outcome of his request for correction was known. NIST has since denied his application, and Haas now seeks leave to file a second amended complaint claiming NIST should be enjoined from continuing its technical investigation until: (1) valid information is dissemination to the public; and (2) a criminal investigation into the controlled demolition of WTC7 is initiated and the outcome thereto is known. (Haas Opp’n Mem. at 18; Haas Aff d Iffl 18-19).

information, unless the individual bringing the action is an “original source” of the information.11 To be an “original source” of publicly disclosed information, a plaintiff must have direct and independent knowledge of information on which the lawsuit’s allegations are based, and have voluntarily provided such information to the Government prior to filing the action. See, ¤ 3730(e)(4)(B); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, – – U.S. – -, 127 S.Ct. 1397, 1407 (March 27, 2007).

Plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds voluntarily provided such “publicly disclosed information …to the Government prior to filing the action” by filing their Requests for Correction with NIST last year.

To even attempt to assert this type of lawsuit, plaintiff must possess and be an original source of at least the substantive information publicly disclosed about the particular fraud. See, United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale Univ., 415 F.Supp.2d 58, 72 (D.Conn. 2006) (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991)).

This is a disputable proposition but I leave such diputation to attorney Leaphart and other experts with legal credentials and expertise. Reynolds and Wood are research analysts who have assembled unique data sets demonstrating the fraudulent nature of the NIST and the work of its contractors, who engaged in willful blindness, at a minimum, for profit. Further, both Wood and Reynolds disclosed the fraud to the government, and therefore should qualify as original sources.

A party lacks direct and independent knowledge “if a third party is ‘the source of the core information’ upon which the … complaint is based.” United States v. New York Med. Coll., 252 F.3d 118, 121(2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990)).

The allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints are based entirely on information made publicly available through NIST’s administrative investigation, the administrative report resulting therefrom (i.e, NCSTAR 1), a prior civil action12 and various media accounts.

This is obviously false for no plane analysts, who surely are “outside the mainstream” as well as outside the official 9/11 “Truth” Movement, a limited hangout which insists on protecting the fundamental basis of the official 9/11 story. The conclusion that no planes crashed into the WTC towers was developed logically from information developed by no plane researchers like Dr. Reynolds rather than from “information made publicly available through NIST’s administrative investigation, the administrative report resulting therefrom (i.e., NCSTAR 1), a prior civil action and various media accounts.” Only a knowledgeable skeptic and researcher like Dr. Reynolds could put together the proof that the WTC plane crashes were fraudulent and subsequently covered up by deceitful analysis by NIST and its hired guns. Citing the Kevin Ryan employment termination suit as the source of “publicly disclosed” information is wrong because Ryan is a defender of plane crashes and proponent of internally planted thermite/thermate in sharp contrast to Reynolds and Wood who both contend that there were no plane crashes and directed energy weapons destroyed the WTC.

Their lawsuits

11 Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides:

No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administration or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. 31 U.S.C. ¤ 3730 (e)(4)(A) (footnote omitted).

12 In their respective complaints, plaintiffs allege that defendant Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (“UL”) “overtly suppressed [ ] information [from NIST] by terminating the

simply rely upon their own theoretical examination of information already within the public domain.

False, Reynolds and Wood assembled unique empirical data sets proving no planes and DEW and publicly disclosed these data to NIST through formal Requests for Correction. No other relators developed these unique data sets and analyses and disclosed them to NIST. Plaintiffs’ attempted analysis of that information constitutes pure speculation

What? “Pure speculation”? Piffle. See the Reynolds and Wood affidavits for abundant data demonstrating the fraudulent nature of the NIST and contractor findings.

…that the NIST participants were involved in a cover-up to conceal the true cause for the towers’ collapse. They merely disagree with NIST’s investigative findings,

Reynolds and Wood do not “merely disagree” but show in detail via verifiable evidence that the NIST/defendant findings are bogus

…and specifically wish

Wish? Loaded language again. Reynolds and Wood disagree with NIST and its contractors based on scientific analysis of the data rather than “wishing” for anything.

…to reject the basic factual premise that terrorist [sic] destroyed the Twin Towers using passenger-filled airplanes as missile-like weapons.

The four unproven airplanes of 9/11allegedly had 27% average occupancy.

Plaintiffs, understandably, offer nothing more than conjecture and supposition

This is a slur, totally over-the-top. “Understandably”? “Offer nothing more than conjecture and supposition”? Reynolds and Wood, conducting truly independent investigations, offer hundreds of verifiable facts at variance with NIST and contractor report NCSTAR 1. As plainly shown in their affidavits, plaintiffs Reynolds and Wood offer a great deal of evidence and scientific principles (e.g., Newton’s laws of motion) to support their claims.

…to support their claim that the towers were struck by high powered energy beams.

Neither plaintiff Reynolds and Wood used the term “high powered energy beams,” that is language “crafted” by the defendants to discredit plaintiffs.

Their personal hypothesis

“Personal hypothesis” is an odd new term. Apparently it is intended to convey the idea that plaintiffs Reynolds and Wood merely have subjective theories about what happened on 9/11 and no objective evidence instead of strong evidence supported by sound reasoning.

…about what should be concluded from publicly disclosed information does not qualify either of them as an original source of information in order to sustain an individual FCA claim on behalf of the Government. See, Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1159; see also, New York Med. Coll., 252 F.3d at 121-22. Federal jurisdiction over a private FCA action is not created simply by arguing that the review of publicly disclosed information spurs plaintiffs to advance a different theory.

My legal argument is that both plaintiffs qualify as original relators under the False Claims Act because we assembled data sets gathered by no other relator and disclosed them to NIST, the relevant government agency defrauded, although the real victim is the United State of America.

Such an argument, based solely on publicly available information, could no more support a federal lawsuit to advance an alternative theory regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, or whether men ever actually landed on the moon.

Whoa, this charge is way over-the-top. Talk about a judicial stretch. The assassination of President Kennedy and whether men landed on the moon have absolutely nothing to do with the Wood and Reynolds cases as drafted. The judge has unfortunately adopted the defendants’ tactics of ridicule, scorn and guilt by association by accusing plaintiffs, in effect, of being “conspiracy theorists” without facts about events suspected by the conspiracy community of being fraudulent.

In addition to the FCA claims, plaintiff Reynolds also asserts State common law causes

services of one of its employees, Kevin Ryan, who called attention to [the] incongruity of causal explanation.” (Wood Am. Compl. ]f 39; Reynolds Compl. ]f 37). Prior to the commencement of the cases at bar, Kevin Ryan filed suit against UL claiming he was wrongfully discharged because he had sent an e-mail to NIST indicating that: UL had conducted WTC-related metallurgical testing; the official explanation for the destruction of the WTC was not supported by a scientific analysis of the evidence; and there was substantial evidence that all three buildings collapsed from explosive devices. (Ryan v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., No. 06-1770 (S.D.Ind. filed Nov. 16, 2006). Thus, the information at the heart of the Wood and Reynolds litigation “was publicly disclosed because it was available to anyone who wished to consult the [Ryan] court file.” Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1158.

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of action for unjust enrichment, payment by mistake, recoupment of overpayment, and fraud.13 However, as plaintiffs’ attorney acknowledges, the Congressional grant of private standing to sue in FCA cases does not extend to common law causes of action. See, United States ex rel. Phipps v. Comprehensive Cmty. Dev. Corp., 152 F.Supp.2d 443, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also United States ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Rockefeller ex rel. United States v. Washington TRU Solutions, LCC, 2004 WL 180264 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 21, 2004). Plaintiffs asserted these common law claims in a representative capacity on behalf of the United States Government.

Why bring all this up? It is stipulated by all parties, Perhaps it is legitimate as a way to legally dispose of it. Otherwise, it looks like an attempt to impugn the competence of plaintiffs’ counsel.

Neither plaintiffs claim to be personally aggrieved or damaged as a result of the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing.

Wow!? How can this charge be sustained? Plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds represented the United States of America by law and if their claims were supported, then by definition plaintiff = USA is aggrieved and damaged by fraud intended to deceive the American people about the most important event of the 21st century.

All common law claims are, therefore, dismissed for lack of standing. Accordingly, plaintiffs Wood and Reynolds’ actions are barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Non sequitur. This is the wrong place to insert such a sweeping conclusion because common law claims were inactive.

PLAINTIFFS’ PLEADINGS ARE WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A LAWSUIT

“Wholly”? That is piilng on.

Even if the requisite jurisdiction had existed, dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaints is

independently warranted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim and for failure to plead fraud with the requisite particularity mandated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).14

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the complaint

13 Plaintiff Wood asserted these common law causes of action in her original complaint. In her amended complaint, she indicates that her action is being brought “under the common law or equitable theories of unjust enrichment, payment under mistake of fact, recoupment of overpayments and common law fraud.” (Wood Am. Compl. ]f 1). Nevertheless, no basis for any common law claims are specifically pled in her amended complaint. True? I don’t know.

14 The implausabily [sic] of plaintiffs’ theories warrants no further consideration by this Court beyond the insufficiency of the legal claims upon which plaintiffs attempt to advance those theories in their lawsuits. This is true because the court is under no obligation to craft pleadings of sufficiency for plaintiffs but the real issue is whether plaintiffs have pled with sufficiency.

“must create the possibility for a right to relief that is more than speculative.”15 Spool v. World Child Int’l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2008). Although complaints generally “do[ ] not need detailed factual allegations, [ ] plaintiff[s’] obligation to provide the grounds of [their] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. – -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (May 21, 2007) (internal citations, quotation marks and original brackets omitted). Plaintiffs’ theories about the cause of the 9/11 disaster completely fail to state a cognizable claim for relief.

Plaintiffs Reynolds and Wood (see affidavits) provided detailed factual allegations about the scientific and technical fraud perpetrated by the defendants, thereby establishing cognizable claims for relief under FCA, especially in view of their public disclosure of the fraud to NIST.

To state a FCA claim, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege that defendants knowingly presented a false or fraudulent claim; knowingly made or used a false record or statement to get a fraudulent claim paid; or knowingly made or used a false record or statement to decrease their obligation to pay the Government. The theory of plaintiffs’ lawsuit is that the defendants violated the FCA because they were not entitled to any remuneration for the services they rendered to NIST since NIST ultimately failed to conclude, consistent with plaintiffs’ hypothesis, that the Twin Towers was destroyed by the military’s directed energy weapons.

The use of the term “military’s” is piling on since I do not believe it was used by either plaintiff Reynolds or Wood.

The results of defendants’ evaluations are incompatible with plaintiffs’ own interpretations. This does not, however, give rise to a reasonable inference that defendants are not entitled to any compensation from the Government for the services they provided. See, Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Swafford v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 98

But Judge Daniels, plaintiffs Reynolds and Wood offer compelling evidence that defendants knowingly engaged in fraud by a simple comparison of their technical expertise with the impossible stuff they cooked up for NIST. The defendants obviously know better, but they still cooked up nonsense for NIST. There is no other reasonable conclusion that can be drawn but that the defendants deliberately engaged in a cover up to sustain the official 9/11 myth.

15 The sufficiency of the pleadings is determined by examination of the complaint, the exhibits attached thereto, and matters incorporated by reference therein. Other independent submissions made by the defendants, with regard to the jurisdictional challenge, were not considered in assessing the legal adequacy of the complaints.

Huh? What does this mean? Is this a legitimate legal omission?

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F.Supp.2d 822, 833 (W.D.Mich. 2000), aff’d 24 Fed.Appx. 491 (6th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiffs have pled no factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that defendants knowingly sought payment from the government to which they were not entitled.

But standard governmental contracts would bar deception, fraud, slipshod work, etc. Such evidence could be introduced but was not. This part of the decision furnishes no grounds for dismissal since it can be proved that intentionally deceptive work is a federal contract violation. The judge is trying the case without an opportunity for plaintiffs to respond to his erroneous assertions.

Plaintiffs wish

Here we go again with the charge that the “plaintiffs wish.”

…to reach the conclusion that no compensation was owing to defendants by relying on the other self-serving conclusion

Isn’t this “self-serving” conclusion term prejudicial? The judge is supposed to be impartial rather than an adversary to any party to the dispute.

…that the services they rendered were worthless.

Given that the defendants knowingly participated in a provable fraud, their services were worse than worthless. They not services at all, they were disservices, treasonous in character, protecting the enemies within from justice.

In plaintiffs’ view, defendants would only be entitled to compensation if NIST had acknowledged plaintiffs’ theory that directed energy weapons, and not a terrorist attack, was responsible for the destruction of the WTC.

As usual, the judge makes no mention of planes/no planes. He never addressed the facts about planes/no planes, not once. In any event, his charge here is an absurd and presumptuous way to put it. It is not about what conclusion the fraudsters were supposed to reach but rather what they did. What they did was participate in a cover up of the most momentous event of the 21st century, a fraud itself.

Seeking payment for services

If fraudulent, services are disservices to the United States of America, so the judge should have written: “Seeking payment for disservices…”

…rendered to NIST is not unlawful simply because the plaintiffs themselves disagree with NIST’s investigative findings.

The suits are not “simply because we plaintiffs disagree with NIST’s investigative findings but because the plaintiffs can prove in a courtroom that the defendants committed fraud. The judge, however, cut the plaintiffs off at the pass by granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

See generally, Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In a worthless services claim, the performance of the service is so deficient that for all practical purposes it is the equivalent of no performance at all.”). Even purported errors

Plaintiffs do not allege innocent “errors” but fraud, deliberate deception detectable by scientific researchers.

…based on flawed reasoning, mathematic calculations, or scientific judgments are not false for purposes of the FCA.

We agree. This is a red herring. See, Pfmgston v. RonanEng’gCo., 284 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1421; United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 345 F.Supp.2d 313, 329 & n.87 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to plead any factual allegations to support their FCA claims asserted under “the ‘reverse false claims’ provision, ¤ 3729(a)(7), which creates FCA liability for false statements designed to conceal, reduce, or avoid an obligation to pay money or property to the Government.” United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital Mkts., Inc., 377 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2004).

We agree with this whole section but why is it here? Plaintiffs never made any such claim. “This section was added ‘to provide that an individual who makes a material misrepresentation to avoid paying money owed the Government would be equally liable under the Act as if he had submitted a false claim to receive money.” United

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States ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 18, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5283 (1986)). Plaintiffs cannot identify any existing financial obligation any of the defendants owed to the Government, nor can they identify any specific false record or statement that a defendant made to avoid such a purported obligation. The pleadings are therefore also insufficient to state a reverse false claims cause of action.

Since plaintiffs never made any such claim, why is this section here?

Plaintiffs have not only failed to comply with the liberal pleading standards applicable to a consideration of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),

Ordinarily a civil suit has such a liberal/low pleading standard but not in the Reynolds and Wood cases. Why is that? To point out the obvious, the political implications of exposing the 9/11 fraud under oath via discovery would risk momentous changes, leading to a “re-boot of the system”!

…they have also failed to meet the stricter pleading standard under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Claims asserted under the FCA, an anti-fraud statute, are also subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleadings standard, requiring averments of fraud to be pled with particularity. Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476-77 (2d Cir. 1995); see also, Eisenstein v. Whitman, 4 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledges that to satisfy Rule 9(b) “the Second Circuit has said that the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statement were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” (Reynolds Opp’n Mem. at 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

We establish such specificity about the fraud in our pleadings, especially in my affidavit.

Plaintiffs argue that their pleadings comply with the Second Circuit criteria because they (1) identify the subject statements as being “each and every time during a two plus-year period that defendants made false claims for payments based on fraudulently performed work”; (2) “adequately alleges the ‘identity of the speaker’ as being these defendants”; (3) “adequately pleads ‘where and when the statements were made.’ They were made in NCSTAR 1”; and (4) explains the statements were fraudulent because they concealed the true cause for the

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Twin Towers’ collapse. (Id. at 36). Such general and conclusory pleadings fall far short of Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard.

Plaintiffs vaguely allege that, for a number of years, all defendants wrongfully sought payment for services performed in bad faith.16 They do not cite to a single identifiable record or billing submission that they claim to be false, or give a single example of when a purportedly false claim was presented for payment by a particular defendant at a specific time.

Is this really necessary? Rather absurd, isn’t it? Plaintiffs were not witness to a specific transaction nor do they need to be. These 9/11 researchers and plaintiffs resemble analysts who detect fraud from outside a corporation and blow the whistle or short the stock to profit thereby. As scientists, however, Reynolds’ and Wood’s 9/11 work provide certainty that outside financial analysis ordinarily cannot. Further, NIST continues to frustrate Dr. Reynolds’ attempts via FOIAs and payment of $398.94 to obtain the complete record of payments to defendants. On August 28, 2008, more than 8 months after my FOIA, NIST sent Reynolds 11 NIST contracts with lots of overlapping boiler plate in each contract, differing only in dollar amounts and exact scope of work for each contractor. NIST insisted on receiving another $258.02 for processing my request. Absurd.

Additionally, plaintiffs’ general attribution, to the defendants, of the purported false statements published in the NCSTAR 1 report is untenable to support a particularized pleading of fraud. Defendants are not the authors of the report,

Yet the defendants were first drafters of many chapters in the NIST report. This is public knowledge for a few chapters and provable in discovery. Further, the defendants are all hired “supporters” of the report, lending their scientific and technical prestige to “sell” a fraudulent report to an inattentive public.

…and plaintiffs point to no specific factual assertion relied upon in the report that was allegedly falsely provided by defendants to NIST.

What? I included specific factual assertions like ARA was responsible for the fraudulent animations of an aluminum jetliner disappearing into a steel/concrete tower, etc.

Plaintiffs merely allege the existence of a nefarious conspiracy of epic proportion.

This is another over-the-top smear. Plaintiffs do not “merely allege the existence of a nefarious conspiracy of epic proportion,” but rather provide extensive empirical evidence and scientific principles that expose the fraud that constitutes NCSTAR 1.

They name all defendants as coconspirators. They therefore conclude that all defendants’ work records and the services they performed are fraudulent because they are tainted by the illegal conspiracy in which they participated. Such generalized attempts at fraud pleading

Actually, conspiracy theory might work as a legal charge but that is not the plaintiffs’ claim. Rather, plaintiffs claim that the defendants individually and jointly violated the FCA.

fail to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). See, United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556-57 (8th Cir. 2006) (Alleging all work performed by defendants was illegal and

16 Both the Wood and Reynolds complaints allege, in pertinent part: The various cost reports, requisitions, billing statements and/or requests for reimbursements submitted by the defendant NIST participants … all contain false claims for reimbursement and made false statements … because the true nature and intent was to mislead NIST and to cause a false causal statement concerning what caused the destruction for the WTC complex to occur. *** All such submitted cost reports, invoices, reimbursement claims and the like constitute false claims under the False Claims Act because the defendants knew … that the actual cause of the destruction of the WTC complex was the result of the use of directed energy weapons. (Wood Am. Compl. Iffl 56, 59-60; Reynolds Compl. Iffl 54, 57-58).

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every invoice fraudulent because of an underlying conspiracy to submit fraudulent claims fails to satisfy Rule 9(b)); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The False Claims Act [ ] focuses on the submission of a claim, and does not concern itself with whether or to what extent there exists a menacing underlying scheme.”).

I leave these assertions to counselor Leaphart’s tender mercies or other knowledgeable legal observers.

Plaintiff Haas’ complaint, for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. ¤ 551 et seq, is also insufficiently pled.17

Whoops a-daisy! That’s it for Reynolds and Wood? Nowhere has Judge Daniels dealt with the fundamental argument for qualification as original relators, namely, notification of NIST of fraud via the “Requests for Correction” process.

His claim is premised on NIST’s failure to suspend its investigation while his request, seeking a change of information, was under consideration. Because that request has since been denied by NIST, his causes of action, relating to the existence of a pending request, no longer even presents a live controversy for which relief would be available, and is therefore moot. See, White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff Haas, however, argues that his claim now, as alleged in his proposed amended complaint, is actually premised on the alleged intentional dissemination of contradictory information by NIST, in violation of the Information Quality Act. He seeks an order of forbearance requiring NIST to cease its investigation “until valid (i.e. quality) information has been disseminated in place of the currently contradictory information available to the public.”18

17 The complaints also state that Haas is suing, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violations of his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. The complaints, however, fail to contain any factual allegations to support such a claim, and no constitutional cause of action is specifically pled.

18 Haas further “claims [ ] that there is evidence that warrants a parallel criminal investigation into whether or not there was a motive and opportunity for those that might have had prior knowledge of the September 11, 2001 attacks, to take advantage of the event and destroy WTC7 for yet to be fully understood purposes.” (Haas Aff d \ 10). Plaintiff contends that “[s]uch a criminal investigation could reveal that the direction NIST is heading with its

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(Haas Opp’n Mem. at 18). Plaintiffs proposed alternative legal theory is unavailing. The Information Quality Act does not create any legal rights, enforceable by unrelated third parties, to information or its correctness.

This seems arguable although the judge puts it in an extreme fashion: “legal rights …to information or its correctness.”

See, Salt Inst, v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2006); Ams. for Safe Access v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2007 WL 2141289, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 24, 2007); In re Operation of the Missouri River Sys. Litig., 363 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1174 (D.Minn. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005). Neither the Information Quality Act, nor the Administrative Procedure Act, create a private right of action upon which plaintiff may independently pursue this litigation.

Too broad? Perhaps but I leave it to you. I must say that overall I agree with the judge’s decision and reasoning in the Haas case. The presence of the Haas case and its being rolled into ours did not help the Reynolds and Wood cause because the Haas case was weak, and now the judge uses this fact to weaken public perception of the strength of the Reynolds-Wood evidence and reasoning.

Regardless of how plaintiff Haas attempts to characterize his “forbearance” claims, dismissal is warranted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. NIST is not legally required to cease its congressionally mandated investigation every time an interloper questions the accuracy of one of its statements. Such a forbearance policy would indefinitely delay significant investigations.

Delay? Yes, agreed, for sure.

An influx of illegitimate requests that information be changed would effectively cripple the process. Hence, defendants’ motion to dismiss Haas’ first amended complaint is granted. Plaintiff Haas’ motion to file a second amended complaint is denied on the grounds of futility.19

technical investigation into the WTC7 failure is completely without merit.” (Id.). He therefore argues that NIST’s “technical investigation [should be] halted until the outcome of the criminal investigation is determined.” (Id. \ 18).

19 The non-governmental defendants’ motions for sanctions, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. ¤ 3730(d)(4) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, are denied.

This rather important decision is buried in a footnote. Why?

A belief, no matter how incredible, that the WTC was destroyed using secret exotic weaponry, does not give rise to even a colorable claim for relief.

The use of the word “incredible” is probably OK in this context. Btw, what does “does not give rise to even a colorable claim for relief” mean exactly? In context, it sounds very decisive in rejecting defendants’ arguments and pleadings for sanctions on the plaintiffs.

All plaintiffs, as well as the attorney for the plaintiffs here, are hereby warned that filing further successive untenable actions may result in the imposition of monetary or other serious sanctions.

This is a rather draconian threat, especially since it may be interpreted as a warning to all potential litigants, not just the present plaintiffs and might refer to any and all savvy 9/11 researchers and/or activists to discourage future private civil action. This general threat serves the powers-that-be and disserves the American people, many of whom hunger for truth about 9/11 and the War on Terror.

See, Catanzano v. Wallenstein, 142 Fed.Appx. 540 (2d Cir. 2005); Iwachiw v. New York City Bd. of Elections, 126 Fed.Appx. 27, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2005); Pentagen Techs. Int’l Ltd. v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 63 Fed.Appx. 548 (2d Cir. 2003).

Do these citations really support this kind of judicial threat? I leave that to the legal fraternity.

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CONCLUSION

The defendants’ motions to dismiss, filed in each of these three eases, are granted. All three complaints are dismissed with prejudice.2’1

Why dismiss with prejudice? Isn’t this extraordinary? It needs explanation but there is none. The Wood v. Applied Research Associates. Inc.. et ai. 07 CV 3314 (GBD); Reynolds v. Science Applications Int’l. et a!.. 07 CV 4612 (GBD). and Haas v. Gutierrez, et al. 07 CV 2623(GBD) actions are hereby closed.

Is this normal language —hereby closed? Perhaps but it suggests “imperial blockage” of Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal of the decision. Go Judy go!

Dated: New York, New York June 26,2008

SO ORDERED:

4^ 8). ‘J)

u

GEORGE B. DANIELS

United States District Judge

“(1 Dismissal is appropriate as to all defendants, including those who have yet to be served. See, Eisenstein. 4 Fed.Appx. at 26 n.2 ((/noting Lconhard v. United States. 633 F.2d 599. 608 (2d Cir. 1980)).